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ABSTRACT
Introduction: This paper describes a hazard- and risk-based strategy and recommendations
on relevant biosafety levels in facility design of a new veterinary faculty building including
a veterinary medical teaching hospital. Both animal and human health were considered.
Materials and methods: Agents listed in the regulatory frameworks on animal and human
health were identified as the main potential hazards. Suggestions on biosafety level and
facility design were based on the official risk grouping of those agents, the associated risk
management procedures, and biosafety experiences from previous faculty buildings.
Results and Discussion: It was suggested that VHC should not be designed for work with
agents requiring facilities at biosafety levels 3 and 4, and that actions in cases of accidental
exposure to notifiable infections should follow the regulatory requirements. Facilities requir-
ing biosafety level 2 were identified from risk scenarios and transmission routes.
Experiences from the first five years of operation revealed good prevention of spread of
infection from patients in isolation facilities and successful elimination of Salmonella and
MRSA from the large animal clinic.
Conclusion: In order to avoid costly construction mistakes, an overall biosafety strategy
should be formulated and used as guidance for architects and other relevant stakeholders
designing facilities for the animal health sector. Regulatory requirements on infectious dis-
eases must be complied with.
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Introduction
Research, teaching, and clinical training of students at
a veterinary faculty frequently involve exposure to animal
and zoonotic pathogens, and a risk for subsequent infec-
tions in both animals and humans. Numerous reports
describe outbreaks of infections, particularly in clinical
settings but also spread from laboratories, of agents like
Mycobacterium bovis and Foot and Mouth Disease
(FMD) [1–4]. Salmonella is a well-known cause of noso-
comial infection [5,6] and, during recent years, a risk of
spreading antibiotic-resistant pathogens has increasingly
been reported [7–10]. Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in equine hospitals is
a concern for both animal and public health [11,12].
A veterinary faculty building and teaching hospital thus
needs to be designed to allow for implementation of
appropriate biosafety measures to protect both animals
and humans.
Guidelines to avoid nosocomial infections in
human hospital and laboratory facilities are known
[13–16], and can also be applied in the veterinary
sector, in particular for the prevention of occupa-
tional infections. Biosafety reports or guidelines for
animal hospitals have been published [17–23].
However, none of these covers the design of veter-
inary faculty buildings, which in addition to
a teaching hospital with ambulatory practice also
include facilities for post mortem examination,
microbiology, anatomy, and obstetrics. In addition,
to our knowledge there are no corresponding guide-
lines or reports that consider the regulatory require-
ments and responsibilities for actions in cases of
accidental exposure or outbreaks of diseases classified
as dangerous to animals and public health.
This paper presents a novel hazard- and risk-based
approach developed for identification of relevant bio-
safety levels of a planned veterinary faculty building
combined with an animal teaching hospital. The
approach was based on assessment of the regulatory
requirements for prevention and control of infectious
diseases in both animals and humans. Some biosafety
risk functions were highlighted and some approaches
for relevant risk-reducing design and management
were suggested. These suggestions were based on
experiences from previous veterinary faculty build-
ings, obtained through interviews with individuals
responsible for those functions. The outcome of the
biosafety plan following five years of implementation
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was also assessed through repeat interviews with
those key individuals and with key managers.
Material and methods
Buildings and facilities
The subject of the assessment was all the buildings
and associated facilities for a new veterinary faculty
building (Centre for Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science; hereafter referred to as VHC) at the Swedish
University for Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Uppsala,
Sweden. In addition to a university teaching hospital
for small and large animals and a large animal ambu-
latory practice (here referred to as VMTH), VHC had
to include conventional office spaces, lecture halls,
research laboratories for different faculty depart-
ments, and special facilities for post mortem exam-
inations, microbiology, anatomy, and obstetrics, with
supporting infrastructure. VHC was planned to pro-
vide for the education of some 1,000 students in
veterinary medicine, animal science, and veterinary
nursing programs. The completed VHC complex has
a total area of 53 000 m2, distributed over six con-
nected sections, of which one is VMTH (Figure 1–3).
The main architectural design was decided in 2008,
followed by detailed planning of the functions, space,
and when relevant, biosafety required by each
department.
The starting point for the present analysis was
a biosafety strategy plan for VHC developed in 2009
[24]. The plan, which involved all relevant stake-
holders including the academic staff, suggested mod-
ifications to the pre-final design that were considered
in the final design of the buildings. VHC opened in
2014 and has been fully operating since then, allow-
ing for assessment of the first five years of experi-
ences of implementation of the biosafety plan.
Figure 1–3. Images of the centre for veterinary
medicine and animal science (VHC). [Separate files].
Hazard identification
The hazards considered in the biosafety plan con-
cerned exposure of animals and humans to biological
agents (bacteria, viruses, prions, parasites, and fungi)
that can cause diseases in animals and to agents that
can cause disease in, and be transmitted between,
animals and humans, i.e. zoonoses. These notifiable
diseases are categorized as occupational hazards,
communicable human diseases, or animal pathogens.
The numbers and interrelations of these three groups
of diseases are illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 1.
Agents only pathogenic to humans were excluded
from the biosafety plan.
Animal health
Listed diseases. In Sweden, there is no risk-based clas-
sification of all potential animal pathogens as applied
for human pathogens (see below). Instead, any inci-
dence of agents and diseases found to be of special
importance primarily to food-producing animals or
agents with zoonotic potential must be reported to the
animal health authority (Swedish Board of Agriculture
[25]). Based on factors like contagiousness and eco-
nomic or zoonotic importance, some of these notifiable
diseases are further prioritized and listed by legislation
on epizootics [26] and zoonoses [27] (Table 1). Some of
the diseases are also prioritized by regulations prescrib-
ing often very detailed and rigorous control measures,
as a rule aiming at rapid eradication e.g. in the case of
outbreaks of highly transmissible epizootic diseases like
FMD, African swine fever, and highly pathogenic avian
influenza. For European Union (EU)-harmonized dis-
eases, control is in accordance with acting EU directives
and, when applicable, World Organization for Animal
Health/OIE recommendations.
Non-listed diseases. Non-listed pathogens or diseases
cover a wide range of infections and include e.g.
Figure 1. Aerial view of the centre for Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VHC), Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences,
Uppsala, Sweden. For further information, see Figure 2. (Source ISBN 978-91-576-9344-0).
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endemically occurring respiratory and gastrointest-
inal infections.
Public health – occupational infections
Risk classification. Agents considered to be potential
human pathogens are listed in the Swedish Work
Environment Act [13], which is based on an EU
directive [16]. Both regulations also include risks
related to exposure to agents in the animal healthcare
sector. The agents are classified into four risk groups,
although the classification of zoonotic agents only
takes into account disease in humans (Table 1):
Risk group 1 agents are unlikely to cause disease in
humans.
Risk group 2 agents can cause disease in humans
and may pose a hazard to workers, but spread to the
community it is unlikely. This risk group includes
most of the pathogenic viruses, bacteria, and fungi,
and includes e.g. herpes simplex, MRSA and non-
typhoid Salmonella (in total 301 agents).
Risk group 3 agents can cause severe human dis-
ease, present a serious hazard to workers and may
also spread to the community. This group includes
agents causing e.g. anthrax, brucellosis, ornithosis,
tularemia type A, EHEC, tuberculosis, typhoid fever,
dysentery, rabies, and bovine spongiform encephalo-
pathy (BSE) (in total 100 agents).
Risk group 4 agents are a serious hazard to work-
ers and may present a high risk of spread to the
community. This group includes e.g. smallpox,
Lassa fever, ebola virus and other viral hemorrhagic
fevers (in total 12 agents).
In total, approximately 420 pathogens are listed
as potential occupational hazards, including 160
bacteria, 150 viruses, 6 prions, 70 parasites, and
30 fungi.
Public health – communicable diseases
For the Swedish public health situation, a limited
number of risk group 3 and 4 diseases from the
Work Environment Act [13] are listed as notifiable
according to the Communicable Diseases Act and
Communicable Diseases Ordinance [33]. Some of
these notifiable diseases are further prioritized into
three different categories, mandatory contact tracing
(50), dangerous to public health (28) and dangerous
to society [3], as summarized in Table 1.
Public health – zoonoses
Thirty (83.3%) of the diseases listed as dangerous to
public health or to society and 11 (33.3%) of the
diseases listed as dangerous infections in animals are
zoonoses [26,27] (Table 1). However, only 10 (33.3%)
of the zoonoses listed as dangerous to public health
or to society are also listed as dangerous infections in
animals (Figure 4). Agents that are pathogenic to
both humans and animals may thus have different
prioritizations in the animal and human health per-
spectives. For example, brucellosis is given a high
priority both as a human pathogen (risk group 3)
and as an animal pathogen (listed in the Act on
Epizootic Diseases). The situation differs e.g. for
Salmonella, which only is listed as notifiable as
a human pathogen, but is given high priority as an
animal pathogen (listed in the Act on Epizootic
Diseases). This reflects the fact that in Sweden, a non-
acceptance policy is applied for salmonella infections
in food-producing animals. The opposite applies for
diseases like ornithosis, tularemia type A, and EHEC,
which are all given a higher priority (risk group 3) as
human pathogens than as animal pathogens. These
differences mainly reflect the lack of effective control
measures for those agents in different animal
Figure 2. Site plan for the centre for Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VHC). For further information, see Figure 3.
(Source ISBN 978-91-576-9344-0).
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populations or the environment, in contrast to the
situation for Salmonella.
Occurrence
Sweden is declared free from most of the diseases
included in the Act on Epizootic Diseases, which
thus do not normally occur in Sweden, while several
of the remaining listed diseases may or do occur [29].
Salmonella, which is currently the only pathogen
included in the Act on Zoonosis [27], rarely occurs
in farm animal species in Sweden [30]. Remaining
non-listed pathogens include a wide range of agents,
which often show endemic occurrence. The listed
human pathogens (risk groups 3 and 4) occur rarely
in Sweden. The agents in risk group 2 may normally
occur in both healthy and diseased human and
animals.
Biosafety levels – regulatory requirements
Identification of a relevant biosafety level for VHC
was based on its specifications and had to distinguish
between exposure following planned work with spe-
cific agents, e.g. in a laboratory, and exposure e.g. to
potentially infected animals attending VMTH. The
regulatory requirements on listed infectious diseases
also needed to be complied with.
Figure 3. Detailed site plan for the centre for Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VHC). The diagram continues below.
(Source ISBN 978-91-576-9344-0).
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Biosafety requirements for animal and human
pathogens
Guidelines to ensure occupational biosafety in labora-
tory settings as regards risk group 2 agents must
correspond to the standards for conventional micro-
biological laboratories, while risk groups 3 and 4
require additional biosafety, in biosafety level (BSL)
3 and (BSL4) laboratories, respectively [13]. In the
Nordic countries, there is only one BSL4 laboratory
[31] Work with agents causing the most contagious
animal diseases, which normally only infect animals,
require special high-containment and internationally
approved laboratories [32,28]. In Sweden, high-
containment laboratories for the veterinary sector
are only available at the National Veterinary
Institute (SVA), which can also handle all listed ser-
ious animal diseases [32] (Table 1) and initial work
with samples from suspected FMD outbreaks.
A regulatory framework also applies for clinical and
other non-laboratory settings, including the facilities
at VHC [13]. Additional regulations apply for the
prevention of infections in humans [33]. Due to the
lack of official guidelines for the animal sector, when
devising a risk reduction strategy for VHC, guidelines
from a One Health perspective were considered to be
applicable also in prevention of transmission of ani-
mal infections.
Risk scenarios and transmission routes
Transmission routes into VHC
The major routes of introduction of pathogenic
agents were identified as being through infected ani-
mals admitted as patients or for teaching or research,
and by contaminated dead animals or animal organs
for teaching, post mortem examination, or research.
Contaminated feed was also considered a potential
source of introduction, as were healthy human car-
riers, including staff, students, animal owners, and
other visitors. Individuals with close contact with
animals outside VHC, in Sweden or abroad, and
teachers and students returning from farm visits as
Figure 3. Continued.
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part of their clinical training were considered
a special risk group.
The probability of exposure was assumed to be
reflected by the animal and public health situation
in Sweden. However, agents not normally occurring
in Sweden may enter due to international travel or
imports of animal products, food, and feed ingredi-
ents. Specimens for research, in particular from
developing countries, were considered a potential
high-risk source for the introduction of exotic agents.
Moreover, it was assumed that infections by agents
normally endemic in Sweden, like strangles in horses,
might be introduced if animals in a fulminant stage of
an infection were allowed to enter VHC without any
risk-reducing precautions.
Routes within VHC
It was assumed that an agent introduced to VHC
could be further transmitted, by direct or indirect
contact, within the facilities, e.g. by movement of
live or dead animals, individuals, manure, feed, ven-
tilation, and equipment. The possible spread of food-
borne pathogens to and from catering facilities within
VHC received special attention.
Routes from VHC
A major potential route of spread from VHC was
considered to be via different forms of waste (man-
ure, urine, sewage, water, and laboratory waste).
Other routes considered were infected live animals
from the clinics or contaminated dead or euthanized
animals leaving VHC for post mortem examination
at the nearby SVA facilities (see below). Accidental
release of agents from laboratories would be
a potential and serious risk if recommended biosafety
measures were not in place.
Interviews
Experiences from the previous faculty building were
gathered through personal interviews in 2009 with
key individuals responsible for the facilities and func-
tions requiring BSL 2 (see below) and on-site demon-
strations of the biosafety routines applied. These key
individuals were re-interviewed in 2019, when key
individuals responsible for the overall management
of VHC were also interviewed, to follow up on the
first five years of biosafety experiences in VHC.
Results
Conclusions on appropriate biosafety level for
VHC
The planned use of VHC did not include clinical or
laboratory diagnostic work with animal or human
pathogens requiring BSL 3 or 4 facilities, as SVA is
tasked with that kind of diagnostic work in Sweden.
Thus VHC was planned for work only with agents
requiring facilities BSL 1 and 2. Due to the lack of
risk classification of agents only infecting animals,
a risk assessment by appropriate methods was pre-
scribed to ensure that the recommended biosafety can
be achieved when working with such agents at VHC
[13]. In doubtful cases and for unknown agents, e.g.
currently non-listed viruses, it was recommended that
advice be sought from the relevant authorities.
The management of suspected cases of any notifi-
able animal infections requiring biosafety levels 3 or 4
must be based on the regulatory requirements,
including reporting to the competent Swedish
Figure 4. Number of diseases listed by relevant national agencies in Sweden in 2019 as dangerous to animal health, dangerous
to public health and society, and occupational diseases. For further information, see Table 1.
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authority [25]and referral to the appropriate facility
at SVA. The veterinarian must also immediately
report suspicions of exposure to human pathogens
in risk groups 3 or 4 to the regional medical officer
(13; §17). When following these procedures, the
responsibility for subsequent risk management is
transferred to the competent authority for animal
and public health, respectively.
Facility design
In the proposed strategy for VHC, the following
facilities and associated functions were suggested to
require biosafety level 2 : (1) VMTH, (2) anatomy,
obstetrics, and gynecology facilities managing car-
casses and organs; (3) post mortem examination
facilities and associated laboratories, (4) microbiolo-
gical laboratories for research and teaching, and (6)
houses and other facilities for mammals and aquatic
animals [13]. It was recommended that the design of
these facilities be based on available guidelines on
biosafety (see above), or other recommendations
given in the biosecurity report [24]. Some of the risk-
reducing measures suggested for VMTH and some
additional transverse functions not covered in avail-
able guidelines are described below.
Biosafety of the VMTH
Access limited to authorized persons
It was recommended that access to biosafety level 2
facilities be limited to authorized persons and include
barrier precautions, with a clear separation between
outside/clean and inside/dirty zone and change to
suitable protective clothes and footwear. Thus, all
students and staff entering these facilities, including
VMTH, should only enter and exit at a designated
point following a set protocol. The entry and exit
point had to be welcoming, spacious, adapted to the
number of staff and students, and well ventilated. In
particular, the design had to allow for a natural logis-
tic barrier between clean and dirty areas, and asso-
ciated hygiene procedures.
Carcasses and organs for teaching and post
mortem examination
Special attention was recommended for the transport
of carcasses and organs used for teaching in anatomy,
obstetrics, and gynecology. Apart from safe sourcing
of healthy animals, hygienic protocols and routines
for their intake to VHC, possible section of carcasses
or organs, storage, and exit from VHC for incinera-
tion were recommended in the risk reduction strat-
egy. A special entrance room with elevator and
cleaning facilities for transporting trucks was consid-
ered essential. Within VHC, it was suggested that
organs be transported and stored in closed contain-
ers, and that a dishwasher be installed for cleaning,
including possibly outgoing containers for transport.
In a corresponding way, biosafety transport protocols
had to be worked out for transport of dead animals
from VMTH to post mortem examination or
incineration.
Suspected patients rejected or in isolation stables
Isolation protocols have been shown to significantly
reduce the incidence of hospital-acquired infections
[17]. Thus according to risk reduction strategy for
VHC, animals with clinical signs or epidemiological
links to outbreaks of transmissible infections should
not be allowed to enter the main facilities. For such
risk patients, separately located isolation houses were
recommended, with direct access from outside and
with barrier precautions, including stringent hygiene
management protocols [22]. Ensuring the clinical
skill for identifying such patients was highlighted.
Contingency plans on how to manage such patients,
Table 1. Number of diseases in 2019 listed by relevant national agencies in Sweden as significant for animals and humans.
Some agents are listed as significant for both animals and humans, but given different risk ratings.
Listed/notifiable animal diseases
(Swedish Board of Agriculture)
Dangerous to animal
health
Act on Epizootic Diseases
Dangerous to animal
health
Act on zoonosis
Animal health
Total
188 31 1
Human and
Public
Health
Listed occupational diseases
(Risk groups 2–4)
Listed/notifiable communicable diseases
(Public Health Agency of Sweden)
(Swedish Work Environment
Authority)
Total Mandatory contact
tracing
Dangerous to public
health/Risk group 3
Dangerous to
society/Risk group 4
420 67 50 33 3
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should they be identified after entry to the clinics,
were also suggested.
Returning from farm and field visits
Veterinarians, students, and others returning to VHC
and in particular to VMTH from farm visits present
a risk of introducing infections to VMTH and, more-
over, to other farms on subsequent visits. Relevant
protocols and associated facility design to ensure the
biosafety for this function were needed [22]. The risk
reduction strategy recommended that returns should
only be allowed at designated places with a ‘dirty’
area, where veterinarians and students would wash
and change clothes before entering the ‘clean’ or
interior side of the clinic. Well-planned design of
both sides was advised, to ensure a simple procedure
for washing of footwear and clothes and correspond-
ing routines for equipment, samples, and accessories,
and safe disinfection routines before reuse. Regular
cleaning and disinfection of the medical equipment,
as specified in a biosafety plan, was recom-
mended [22].
Manure management
Manure removal requires special attention in large ani-
mal facilities, due to its volume and the risk of contam-
inating the environment. The risk reduction strategy
suggested that the manure be hygienically stored in
containers under roof in a locked building well sepa-
rated from the animal house. It also suggested that
culverts for mechanical transport of manure should be
accessible over their full length, to allow for cleaning
and disinfection in cases of e.g. salmonella infections
[5,6]. Cleaning and disinfection of culverts on a regular
basis were recommended, to avoid the build-up of spots
of manure and persistent microbial contamination.
Using an increase in environmental contamination
with Salmonella as an early warning of problems with
the hygiene, as suggested by [21], was therefore not
deemed applicable for VMTH.
Wastewater management
Drains are a site for bacterial colonization and should
therefore be routinely disinfected [18]. The drains at
VHC were planned to be connected to the municipal
sewage system and water treatment plants. This is
a safeguard, but outbreaks of FMD virus from
a laboratory have occurred through an inadequate
drainage network [3,4].
Due to the suggested biosafety level for VHC and
the dilution effect of municipal sewage system, in the
risk reduction strategy it was deemed unnecessary to
install facilities for preparedness for disinfection of
wastewater, which has been proposed in guidelines
for certain facilities in human hospitals [34]. The
relevance of these guidelines has been questioned,
because the combined pathogen load to the local
municipal sewage system from all households and
activities outside human hospitals in a city is often
greater than the contribution from a single hospi-
tal [34].
A corresponding situation was assumed to exist for
the release of animal pathogens from VMTH and the
post mortem examination facilities at VHC, and rea-
sonably also when considering microbe release from
animal production farms.
Hygiene
Regular professional cleaning was prescribed to mini-
mize microbial contamination and colonization of
the VHC environment and prevent the build-up of
contaminated spots [18]. Transmission of infections
agents via contact is one of the greatest biosafety
concerns, particularly at public and animal health
clinics [18,35]. Numerous studies have also verified
the importance of hand washing. The single most
efficient method to limit the spread of nosocomial
infections in human healthcare by is hand washing
and/or disinfection before and after treating each
patient. Therefore the risk reduction strategy for
VHC recommended that special attention be paid to
providing convenient hand-washing stations, with
antiseptic and soap dispensers at all significant loca-
tions within VHC. From a food safety perspective, it
was also considered important to highlight the
hygiene routines and washing stations at all the dif-
ferent catering facilities within VMTH and at differ-
ent places in VHC. The strategy stated that, as
standard, only foot-pedal or infrared sensor taps
should be installed, to allow for hands-free access to
tap water.
Follow-up – five years of experience
Overall, the VHC largely functioned as planned. For
the biosafety areas highlighted in the risk reduction
strategy, the following experiences and discrepancies
were observed:
● Isolation facilities. The small animal isolation
unit was frequently fully occupied during the
winter season by Salmonella-infected cats and
the large animal isolation unit had to be
extended by five additional boxes. No spillover
of infections was observed between isolated ani-
mals and animals in the units for ordinary
patients. In the large animal facilities for ordin-
ary patients, Salmonella and MRSA infection in
horses were successfully controlled [36]. For EU
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accreditation of the veterinary education, an
extra protective fence had to be installed to
prevent contact with possibly rabies-infected
small animals if allowed to enter the outdoor
fenced area [37].
● Ventilation. No air-cooling system was installed
in the large animal houses, which led to major
health problems during the warm season when
doors and windows were left open to reduce the
temperature. This resulted in malfunction of the
ventilation, spread of contaminated air between
units, and subsequent problems with viral
respiratory infections. Financial compensation
had to be paid to horse owners, and additional
costs are foreseen for installation of an air-
conditioning system.
● Effluent water. Although not specifically recom-
mended [24], tanks for sterilization of effluent
water were installed in both the small animal
clinic and the post mortem examination rooms.
In the small animal clinic, the sterilization facil-
ities were never used and in the post mortem
examination facilities they are considered to be
both costly and unnecessary.
● Conflicting requirements. During the planning
process, formal requirements on emergency
exits were in conflict with the hygiene barriers
in the theatre for demonstration of carcasses in
the pathology and anatomy departments.
However, the planned biosafety design of bar-
riers was maintained and possible emergency
situations are resolved on a case-by-case basis.
● Hands-free taps. Despite the strong recommen-
dation to only install hands-free taps in VHC,
ordinary manual taps were also installed, e.g. in
the large animal clinic, including in the isolation
stables for infected horses and in fact also later
in the expanded stables.
Discussion
This paper describes relevant biosafety levels sug-
gested for a new veterinary faculty building (VHC)
combined with a university teaching hospital
(VMTH) in Sweden. Relevant risk-reducing designs
and management options suggested for biosafety risk
functions of special importance are also described.
Formulation of the biosafety plan required considera-
tion of the regulatory frameworks on both animal
and human health, thus differing from strategies for
corresponding institutions in the public health sector.
The management of possible exposure to highly
infectious animal diseases (e.g. FMD, African swine
fever and highly pathogenic avian influenza (Table 1)
was highlighted as requiring special attention.
Another area identified as requiring special attention
was exposure to zoonotic agents, for which the reg-
ulatory risk classifications and associated manage-
ment frequently differ between animal or public
health perspectives. In order to avoid suboptimal
design and costly construction mistakes, a hazard-
and risk based approach was applied to assess the
planned operations at the VHC facility.
A limiting factor for risk characterization of dis-
ease-causing agents was the lack of official guidance
in Sweden on prevention and control of all potential
animal pathogens, which is available e.g. in the UK
[38]. Applying a One Health perspective, the guide-
lines for protection of workers [13] were therefore
suggested as suitable also for the prevention of infec-
tions in animals.
Because the planned use of VHC did not include
clinical or laboratory diagnostic work with pathogens
dangerous to animal or human health, it was recom-
mended that VHC should not be planned or designed
for work with agents requiring biosafety levels 3 and
4. Moreover, the risk reduction strategy suggested no
specific facility design or equipment at VHC for the
possible management of agents above risk group 2 or
for diseases listed as dangerous to animal health
(Table 1). This recommendation was based on the
statutory requirements regarding the management of
suspected cases of any notifiable animal and human
infections, which include reporting to the competent
Swedish authorities [13,25].
Experiences from the first five years of full opera-
tion of VHC showed that the facility design largely
followed the suggestions made in the risk reduction
strategy [24]. Deviations found were probably due to
tradition and budgetary concerns. Surprisingly, man-
ual taps were installed at several locations, including
in the isolation stables for infected horses. Tanks for
sterilization of effluent water (not recommended by
the strategy) were installed, but later found to be both
costly and unnecessary [34]. A valuable but costly
lesson was that lack of air-cooling in the large animal
houses resulted in the spread of respiratory viral
infections in hot weather. Costly construction mis-
takes were thus not fully avoided.
However, the suggested biosafety level was fully
adopted. The recommended facilities and biosafety
management for isolation of infectious patients
upon admittance to VMTH have so far prevented
spread of infections to other hospital facilities.
Unforeseen outbreaks of Salmonella and MRSA
from the large animal clinic have also been success-
fully controlled [36].
Conclusions
Planning, building, and operation of veterinary col-
lege buildings that including teaching hospitals is
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a complex process. In order to avoid costly construc-
tion mistakes, a biosafety strategy should be formu-
lated and considered from the start of the design
stage and during the whole construction process. In
the absence of such a strategy document, there is
a risk of the design being guided by opinions from
individual faculty members and other stakeholders,
which may result in suboptimal design due to dis-
proportionate estimates of the requirements for man-
agement of potential microbiological risks. As novel
pathogens to humans and animals are continually
emerging, the biosafety risks should be re-assessed
at regular intervals.
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